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The Struggle to Define Privacy Rights 
and Liabilities in a Digital World and the 
Unfortunate Role of Constitutional 
Standing 
JUAN OLANO* 
Today’s world runs on data. The creation and improve-
ment of technological products and services depend on the 
exchange of data between people and companies. As peo-
ple’s lives become more digitized, companies can collect, 
store, and analyze more data, and in turn, create better tech-
nology. But, because consumer data can be very sensitive 
(think Social Security numbers, GPS location, fingerprint 
recognition, etc.) this cyclical exchange comes with serious 
privacy risks; especially in light of more frequent and so-
phisticated cyberattacks. This creates a face-off between 
technological growth and privacy rights. While it makes 
sense that people should be willing to subside some of their 
privacy in exchange for technological enhancements to 
things like communication, health, and entertainment, com-
panies should also be doing their best to prevent and re-
spond to cyberattacks. 
This Note highlights the urgency created by the combi-
nation of the digitization of consumer lives, sophisticated 
hackers, and inadequate data privacy laws. It explains that, 
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because Congress is yet to legislate and the Supreme Court’s 
findings in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robin created federal circuit splits, data pri-
vacy laws are either non-existent or muddled. As a result, it 
is increasingly difficult for companies or consumers to know 
their rights, responsibilities, and liabilities in this sphere. 
Moreover, this Note calls for Congress to establish federal 
compliance measures with respect to corporate use of con-
sumer data and handling of cyberattacks. However, this 
Note argues that Congress will continue to remain silent 
and, therefore, the Supreme Court, by revisiting the consti-
tutional standing issues presented in Clapper and Spokeo, 
can be the one—for now—to provide much needed guidance 
with respect to data privacy. 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1027 
I. URGENT TIMES KNOCKING AT THE DOOR: SEARCHING FOR 
LEADERSHIP ................................................................. 1032 
A. A Lingering Threat Left Unsolved ......................... 1032 
B. An Absence of Congressional Efforts .................... 1035 
C. The Limited Power of the Federal Trade 
Commission ............................................................ 1037 
D. The Unfortunate Role of Constitutional Standing . 1038 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING REQUIREMENTS AND THE 
CONFUSING INJURY-IN-FACT JURISPRUDENCE ............. 1039 
 Brief Background ................................................... 1039 
 Injury-In-Fact Requirements and Privacy Suits .... 1040 
 LEGALLY PROTECTED INTERESTS AS A VIOLATION 
OF THE LAW ....................................................... 1041 
 CONCRETE AND PARTICULARIZED 
REQUIREMENT ................................................... 1042 
 ACTUAL OR IMMINENT REQUIREMENT ....... 1043 
III. CLAPPER’S FAILED ATTEMPT TO DEFINE IMMINENCE IN 
DATA BREACH SUITS ................................................... 1043 
 A Necessary Disclaimer ......................................... 1043 
 The Creation of a Circuit Split for Imminence of 
Harm ...................................................................... 1044 
 Clapper as the Answer? ......................................... 1045 
 The Circuit Split Persists Through the “Substantial 
2018] DEFINING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN A DIGITAL WORLD 1027 
 
Risk” Standard ....................................................... 1046 
IV. SPOKEO FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN ALTERNATE AVENUE FOR 
STANDING .................................................................... 1047 
 An Opportunity for Related Clarity ....................... 1047 
 The Creation of the Concreteness Conundrum ...... 1048 
 A Post-Spokeo Circuit Split ................................... 1050 
 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS INCONSISTENCIES ......... 1051 
 CONGRESSIONAL INTENT INCONSISTENCIES ...... 1052 
 COURTS IGNORE THE SPOKEO ANALYSIS AND 
MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO ............................. 1054 
V. WHY SO SILENT: THE DIFFICULTY OF ASSIGNING 
LIABILITY IN DATA PRIVACY ....................................... 1055 
 The Problem of the Disappearing Culprit ............. 1055 
 Who Should Take the Hit: Consumers or 
Companies?............................................................ 1055 
 CONSUMER RISKS AND FRIGHT IN A DATA DRIVEN 
SOCIETY ............................................................ 1056 
 CORPORATE LENIENCY FOR INNOVATION AND 
FAIRNESS ........................................................... 1059 
VI. PRIVACY LAWS, RIGHTS, AND LIABILITIES: WHERE DO WE 
GO FROM HERE? .......................................................... 1063 
 Final Thoughts on Data Theft Situations and the 
Supreme Court’s Role ............................................ 1063 
 Final Thoughts on Data Misuse Situations and the 
Supreme Court’s Role ............................................ 1066 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1069 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“If we’re going to be connected, then we need to be protected . . . 
we shouldn’t have to forfeit our basic privacy when we go online to 
do our business,” President Barack Obama stated in a 2015 National 
Public Radio interview.1 He was calling for the federal government 
                                                                                                             
 1 Scott Horsley, Obama: ‘If We’re Going To Be Connected, Then We Need 
To Be Protected,’ NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/alltechconsidered/2015/01/12/376788871/obama-if-were-going-to-be-con-
nected-then-we-need-to-be-protected. 
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to help improve security systems to prevent cyberattacks.2 Ironi-
cally, and underscoring the urgency of Obama’s remarks, cyber-
criminals hacked the United States Central Command’s Twitter ac-
count later that day.3 
The President’s declarations were well-grounded: in 2016 alone, 
there were at least 980 reported4 data breaches through which more 
than 35,233,317 records were exposed.5 Most recently, Equifax re-
ported that a data breach hit 143 million user accounts.6 Juniper re-
search predicted that data breaches will cost at least $2.1 trillion 
globally by 2019.7 
We are living in a vulnerable era where our personal and finan-
cial data is stored in everyday devices, gadgets, and appliances that 
are susceptible to cyberattacks.8 The technological revolution has 
spurred an unprecedented increase in companies’ collection of per-
                                                                                                             
 2 Id. 
 3 Everett Rosenfeld, FBI Investigating Central Command Twitter Hack, 
CNBC (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/12/us-central-command-
twitter-hacked.html. 
 4 Most breaches are not reported or even detected. Steve Morgan, Cyber 
Crime Costs Projected To Reach $2 Trillion by 2019, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/17/cyber-crime-costs-pro-
jected-to-reach-2-trillion-by-2019/#7108068e3a91. “The World Economic Fo-
rum (WEF) says a significant portion of cybercrime goes undetected, particularly 
industrial espionage where access to confidential documents and data is difficult 
to spot.” Id. 
 5 This number only reflects reported breaches involving more than an email, 
user name, and password, meaning that in actuality, there were probably many 
more breaches. See Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Re-
port from Identity Theft Resource Center and CyberScout, ITRC (Jan. 19, 2017), 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/2016databreaches.html. 
 6 See Matt Burgess, That Yahoo Data Breach Actually Hit Three Billion Ac-
counts, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/hacks-data-
breaches-2017. 
 7 Morgan, supra note 4. 
 8 See generally Hacked Cameras, DVRs Powered Today’s Massive Internet 
Outage, KREBSONSECURITY (Oct. 22, 2016), https://krebsonsecurity.com/
2016/10/hacked-cameras-dvrs-powered-todays-massive-internet-outage/. Unlike 
the days when operating systems were only on computers, now they are in our 
phones, on our TVs, in our Wi-Fi networks, in our speakers, and in our home 
appliances. Why Your Chances of Getting Hacked Could Increase This Year, CBS 
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/protect-yourself-from-email-
hacking-cyber-threats/ [hereinafter Hacked]. 
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sonally identifiable information (“PII”), which is defined as any-
thing that can be used to identify, locate, or contact a person.9 PII is 
endlessly provided by consumers and collected by companies online 
through the typical use of technology (think mouse-clicks, social 
media likes, mobile apps, GPS updates, etc.).10 Juniper research 
calls this the “digitization of consumers’ lives and enterprise rec-
ords.”11 
As PII increases, so does the vulnerability of consumer data theft 
or data misuse.12 In this Note, “data theft” will refer to situations of 
lost or stolen PII resulting from a data breach. This involves situa-
tions where companies (e.g., retailers, technology companies, health 
systems, or financial institutions) are hacked and thereby lose con-
sumer PII.13 On the other hand, “data misuse” will refer to the 
wrongful or inaccurate exposure of PII on behalf of companies; this 
involves situations where companies violate a consumer protection 
statute. For example, by violating the Video Privacy Protection Act 
of 1988 (“VPPA”),14 a company endangers the integrity of con-
sumer PII. Put simply, data theft will deal with data breaches and 
data misuse with a company’s violation of a consumer protection 
statute. 
Despite the increased threat of data theft by hackers and data 
misuse by companies, the law and the governmental mechanisms 
that create and enforce it (e.g., Congress, federal agencies, and the 
Supreme Court) have struggled to adapt. The government must step 
in to push for clearer privacy rights and liabilities, and to ensure that 
the law catches up. “Fundamentally, the law is a powerful tool to 
                                                                                                             
 9 John Stringer, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information: What Data 
is at Risk and What You Can Do About It, SOPHOS (Oct. 2011), https://www.so-
phos.com/en–us/medialibrary/pdfs/other/sophosprotectingpii.pdf. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Morgan, supra note 4. 
 12 Irina Raicu, Loss of Online Privacy: What’s the Harm?, MARKKULA 
CENTER FOR APPLIED ETHICS (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/privacy/
loss–of–online–privacy–whats–the–harm/. 
 13 See e.g., Rick Robinson, The Top 5 Retail Breaches, SECURITY 
INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 7, 2014), https://securityintelligence.com/the-top-5-retail-
breaches/ (discussing data theft and breaches against retail stores). 
 14 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012). The VPPA, among other functions, protects 
against the unconsented dissemination a consumer’s personally identifiable rental 
information. Id. 
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assist with setting a . . . standard in data protection, [and in] provid-
ing a degree of security alongside flexibility for [companies] to ap-
proach their policies . . . .”15 
While agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
have increased their limited efforts to protect consumers,16 Congress 
and the Supreme Court have been slower to react. There is “no over-
arching framework legislation in place [for cybersecurity], but [in-
stead] many enacted statutes [that] address various aspects of cyber-
security.”17 Therefore, there is a growing consensus that “the current 
legislative framework for cybersecurity might need to be revised to 
address needs for improved cybersecurity, especially given the con-
tinuing evolution of the technology and threat environments.”18 Cru-
cially, this also means that some cybersecurity harms are statutorily 
addressed, while some are not—a distinction between data theft and 
data misuse. 
The Supreme Court’s efforts are not much different, as the Court 
has not provided anything more than minimal guidance regarding 
privacy rights and liabilities. In its decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA19 (a quasi-data theft suit) and Spokeo, Inc. v. Rob-
ins20 (a data misuse suit), the Supreme Court “failed to articulate an 
intellectual framework that can satisfactorily explain the results in 
                                                                                                             
 15 Liam Lambert, Cyber Security – Attacks, Effects and the Role of the Law, 
MARKET MOGUL (Jan. 5, 2017), http://themarketmogul.com/cyber–security–at-
tacks–effects–role–law/. 
 16 See e.g., FTC Testifies on Efforts to Protect Privacy and Security of Con-
sumer Health Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 22, 2016), https://
www.ftc.gov/news–events/press–releases/2016/03/ftc–testifies–efforts–protect–
privacy–security–consumer–health. 
 17 ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS 
RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES, CURRENT LAWS, 
AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION 2 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf. 
The congressional report cites acts enacted from 1987 to 2002, demonstrating the 
need for new acts. Id.  
 18 Id. at 1. 
 19 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 20 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
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[privacy] cases that are already decided, or that can be usefully em-
ployed to shape legal analysis in cases yet to come.”21 This has re-
sulted in two federal circuit court splits, a post-Clapper and a post-
Spokeo split, which add to the chaos regarding consumer rights and 
corresponding liabilities where PII is stolen or misused.22 
This Note argues that the increased collection, exchange, and 
dissemination of consumer PII, coupled with an upward trend in 
cyberattacks, requires congressional action. Though Congress 
should act to define privacy rights and protections, if its silence con-
tinues to drive the conversation, the Supreme Court may soon 
(again) be in the unique position to provide guidance. When it has 
the chance, considering what is at stake, the Court must be clearer 
than it was in Clapper and Spokeo, which have led to uncertainty 
over the state of litigation, consumers’ availability of redress, and 
adequate cybersecurity thresholds.23 
Part I highlights the urgency created by the frightening combi-
nation of technological innovations, the digitization of consumer 
lives, sophisticated hackers, and governmental inadequacy. It also 
explains the role of the law in defining consumer privacy through 
the FTC, Congress, and the Supreme Court, which either create or 
enforce such laws. Part II briefly explains the constitutional standing 
requirements with a focus on the injury-in-fact requirement, which 
is the crux of consumer protection suits like Clapper and Spokeo. 
Parts III and IV, respectively, discuss the story of data theft and data 
misuse in the court system. Specifically, each Part explains what led 
to Clapper and Spokeo, the flawed analyses used to determine each 
decision, and the resulting chaotic state. Part V demonstrates the 
complexities of what is at stake for consumers and for companies, 
with the goal of showing why Congress and the Court may be too 
afraid to take a stance on anything privacy-related. Finally, Part VI 
urges Congress to legislate, but anticipating congressional silence, 
calls for the Supreme Court to clarify its position in data theft cases 
and to defer to Congress in data misuse cases. 
                                                                                                             
 21 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 290 
(1988). While this Note speaks of standing in general, it reflects where privacy 
standing currently stands as well. 
 22 See infra Parts III, IV. 
 23 Id. 
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I. URGENT TIMES KNOCKING AT THE DOOR: SEARCHING FOR 
LEADERSHIP 
Today, “virtually every organization acquires, uses and stores 
personally identifiable information.”24 As mentioned, PII includes 
anything that can be used to identify, locate, or contact a person.25 
While some may argue this information is not necessarily private,26 
if it ends up in the wrong hands, it can be quite harmful.27 Cyberat-
tacks leading to data theft or made possible by company misuse of 
PII may cause consumers personal harm (e.g., a sense of insecurity 
about one’s private affairs) or financial harm (e.g., fraudulent credit 
card expenses or identity theft).28 According to a Norton study, as 
of 2010, roughly three-quarters of U.S. web surfers had fallen victim 
to cybercrimes including computer viruses, credit card fraud, and 
identity theft.29 
A. A Lingering Threat Left Unsolved 
Hackers do not discriminate. Many of the most prominent com-
panies in the United States and abroad have been hacked over the 
past three years. This includes extramarital affairs site Ashley Mad-
ison (37 million users exposed),30 Yahoo (three billion user accounts 
                                                                                                             
 24 Stringer, supra note 9. 
 25 Id.   
 26 See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT (PIA) GUIDE 2 (2007), https://www.sec.gov/about/privacy/
piaguide.pdf (“PII should not be confused with ‘private’ information. Private in-
formation is information that an individual prefers not to make publicly known, 
e.g., because of the information’s sensitive nature. Personally identifiable infor-
mation is much broader in scope and includes all information that can be used to 
directly or indirectly identify individuals.”). 
 27 What Are the Dangers of PII, PENN ARTS & SCIENCES (2010), http://your-
data.sas.upenn.edu/content/what–are–dangers–pii. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Eli Talmor, Cybercrime Victims Feel Ripped Off, INFOSEC ISLAND (Sept. 
20, 2010), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/8042–Cybercrime–Victims–
Feel–Ripped–Off.html. 
 30 Frank Jennings, You’ve Been Hacked. What Are You Liable For?, THE 
REGISTER (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/14/been_
hacked_what_are_you_liable_for/. 
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exposed), Deloitte, Equifax, Chipotle, Verizon,31 the Federal Re-
serve,32 law firms like Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP33  and Mos-
sack Fonseca,34 JPMorgan Chase,35 and even the United States Pres-
idential election (via the Democratic National Convention).36 
With the expansion of smart technology and use of mobile plat-
forms, the trend will probably only increase.37 As a consequence, 
consumer trust is dropping and insecurity concerns are rising.38 De-
spite the increase in cybersecurity threats and the influx of PII, 
“companies appear unaware of the growing trend in both the scale 
and sophistication of cyber security threats.”39 For example, a 
Ponemon Institute study revealed that “40 [percent] of companies 
do not scan their mobile apps for security vulnerabilities”; almost 
“40 percent of the more than 400 organizations surveyed do not re-
view code for security weaknesses, and 33 percent never even test 
their apps before release”; organizations do not have policies in 
place for acceptable mobile app use; and most companies have not 
                                                                                                             
 31 See Burgess, supra note 6. 
 32 Jose Pagliery & Patrick Gillespie, Federal Reserve Under Attack by 
Hacker Spies, CNN (June 2, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/01/technol-
ogy/federal–reserve–hack/. 
 33 Sara Randazzo & Dave Michaels, U.S. Charges Three Chinese Traders 
With Hacking Law Firms, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/u–s–charges–three–chinese–traders–with–hacking–law–firms–1482862000. 
 34 This is the law firm that was breached in the “Panama Papers” scandal of 
2016. Jessica Durando, Panama Papers: What We Know Now, USA TODAY (May 
9, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/05/09/panama–pa-
pers–leak–documents–tax–shelters/84132964/. 
 35 Kevin Dugan, New Rule Would Require City Firms to Hire Cybersecurity 
Officers, N.Y. POST (Sept. 13, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/09/13/new–rule–
would–require–city–firms–to–hire–cybersecurity–officers/. 
 36 Associated Press, Top US Intelligence Officials to Testify on Russian Hack-
ing, CNBC (Jan. 5, 2017) http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/05/top–us–intelligence–
officials–to–testify–on–russian–hacking.html. 
 37 See Hacked, supra note 8 (“‘If you haven’t been hacked yet, the chances 
are even greater in 2017.’”). 
 38 New Study Shows Public Does Not Trust Social Media Privacy, Supports 
Stronger Privacy Laws, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://epic.org/2016/10/new–study–shows–public–does–no.html. In a survey 
supported by the Craig New Mark Foundation, a majority of Americans “ex-
pressed concern about the lack of safety online, including fears over identity theft, 
email hacking, and non–consensual online tracking.” Id. 
 39 Lambert, supra note 15. 
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or do not know if they have inspected their cloud services for mal-
ware.40 This study is alarming, and to make matters worse, “[m]any 
Americans think privacy laws are too weak,” including millennials, 
who “are increasingly aware of the need for stronger privacy 
laws.”41 
What makes data theft cases so complicated (and data misuse so 
potentially detrimental), is that hackers are often not caught.42 
“Catching hackers remains a tough, tough job,” and “the police can’t 
keep up.”43 This means the liability for data theft or misuse shifts 
away from the culprit and to the companies and consumers. On one 
end, companies should adapt their business practices to the changing 
times.44 According to Garnet, an information technology research 
company, “[o]rganizations should focus on how to detect and re-
spond to malicious behaviors and incidents instead of trying to pre-
vent every threat,” as they are doing now.45 On the other end, con-
                                                                                                             
 40 Christine Kern, Ponemon Study Reveals Startling Lack of Security In Mo-
bile Apps, INNOVATIVE RETAIL TECHS. (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.innova-
tiveretailtechnologies.com/doc/ponemon-study-reveals-startling-lack-of-secu-
rity-in-mobile-apps-0001; Netskope and Ponemon Institute Study: Majority of 




 41 Id. 
 42 James Andrew Lewis, the Senior Vice President and Director at Center for 
Strategic International Studies, and an ex–Foreign Service officer, stated, “We 
don’t catch most cybercriminals and we don’t catch the most successful . . . [s]o 
far there is impunity for cybercriminals.” Tom Risen, Study: Hackers Cost More 
Than $445 Billion Annually, U.S. NEWS (June 9, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2014/06/09/study–hackers–cost–more–than–445–billion–annually. 
 43 Charles Orton-Jones, Catching Hackers is Not Getting Easier, 
RACONTEUR (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.raconteur.net/technology/catching-
hackers-is-not-getting-easier. 
 44 See Lambert, supra note 15 (“The scale and vitriolic nature of attacks are 
becoming more profound. Even with the well documented adverse effects of a 
hack, many companies do not have sufficient policies in place to protect against 
this threat nor do they possess an adequate response plan for an attack.”). 
 45 Christy Pettey & Rob van der Meulen, Gartner Says By 2020, 60 Percent 
of Digital Businesses Will Suffer Major Service Failures Due to the Inability of 
IT Security Teams to Manage Digital Risk, GARTNER (June 6, 2016), http://
www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3337617. 
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sumers must also bear some sort of burden of knowing how to han-
dle sensitive information—who to give it to, when to expect its safe-
keeping, and knowing the risks of voluntarily handing it over.46 
Though it is clear that these things must happen, the question 
then becomes, which party, governmental or otherwise, should en-
sure that they do? 
B. An Absence of Congressional Efforts 
At a time where consumers and companies are pitted against 
each other—because hackers are typically not caught—Congress’ 
legislative efforts have failed to keep up.47 To its credit, some exist-
ing statutes protect consumers from risky business practices and reg-
ulate the exchange of sensitive information—to an extent.48 Cur-
rently, there are several prominent statutes: 
 
 the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”),49 designed 
to regulate the collection of credit information;  
 
 the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 
(“FACTA”),50 designed to increase credit and debit card protec-
tion;  
 
 the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977 
(“FDCPA”),51 designed to battle abusive debt collection prac-
tices;  
 
                                                                                                             
 46 Computer Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 2017), https://www.con-
sumer.ftc.gov/articles/0009-computer-security. 
 47 Martha Wrangham & Gretchen A. Ramos, Calls for Federal Breach Noti-
fication Law Continue After Yahoo Data Breach, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 5, 2016), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/calls–federal–breach–notification–law–
continue–after–yahoo–data–breach. 
 48 See Hacked, supra note 8 (“[P]ersonal data has become a huge area of con-
cern, with strict new laws regarding the sharing and dissemination of medical his-
tory (HIPAA), misinformation in credit reports (Fair Credit Reporting Act), and 
many others.”). 
 49 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
 50 Id. § 1681c. 
 51 Id. § 1962. 
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 the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (“VPPA”),52 de-
signed to protect video-related disclosures;  
 
 the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,53 designed 
to restrict telephone solicitations; and 
 
 the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (“HIPAA”),54 designed, in part, to protect health infor-
mation.  
 
However, aside from HIPAA, which provides data breach notifica-
tion guidelines and penalty guidelines for different types of 
breaches,55 Congress has yet to pass any other statutes to incentivize 
threshold cybersecurity measures or to guide companies’ reactions 
to data breaches.56 
Congress’ failed attempts at passing such data protection laws in 
2014 and 2015 have stalled federal breach legislation.57 Instead, 
there is an “existing spread of 47 state [breach notification] laws.”58 
Even after Russia’s cyberattack on the United States’ 2016 Presi-
dential election and the proposed creation of a new Senate Cyberse-
curity Subcommittee, there have been no more fruitful efforts on the 
way.59 In the absence of such laws, the aftermath of a breach (the 
most recent example being the Equifax breach that affected 145 mil-
                                                                                                             
 52 18 U.S.C. § 2710. 
 53 15 U.S.C. § 552. 
 54 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.400–414; 42 U.S.C. § 1320d. 
 55 See STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, COMPARISON OF US STATE AND FEDERAL 
SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 188–92 (2016), https://www.step-
toe.com/assets/htmldocuments/SteptoeDataBreachNotificationChart.pdf. 
 56 See Wrangham & Ramos, supra note 47. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. For more information on the different state laws see generally STEPTOE 
& JOHNSON LLP, supra note 55. 
 59 Jessica Schulberg & Laura Barrón-López, John McCain To Create New 
Senate Cybersecurity Subcommittee, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 5, 2017), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/john–mccain–cybersecurity–subcommit-
tee_us_586ec07ae4b099cdb0fc5c1d. 
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lion Americans) follows a “familiar script: white-hot, bipartisan out-
rage, followed by hearings and a flurry of proposals that [go] no-
where.”60 
“The lack of legislative response has industry groups and law-
makers . . . uttering a familiar refrain: Wait until next year.”61 Wait-
ing until next year means companies and consumers are left to resort 
to navigating forty-plus different state standards regarding data pro-
tection and breach response.62 It also means that uncertainty over 
consumer rights and data protection guidelines does not seem likely 
to be eased by Congress any time soon. In essence, it is hard to ex-
pect anything from Congress, which only leaves what it has in 
place—the above-mentioned consumer protection statutes. 
C. The Limited Power of the Federal Trade Commission 
The FTC is a congressionally created federal agency empowered 
by the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 to regulate com-
merce.63 It serves as the chief federal agency on privacy policy and 
consumer protection.64 Among other duties, it investigates compa-
nies and takes law enforcement action to ensure that companies are 
keeping their promises and implementing adequate security 
measures.65 
                                                                                                             
 60 Martin Matishak, After Equifax Breach, Anger but No Action in Congress, 
POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/01/equifax-
data-breach-congress-action-319631. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
 64 _Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/about–ftc/bureaus–offices/bureau–consumer–protection 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2018). 
 65 Id. Section 5(a) of the FTC Act empowers the agency to “prevent persons, 
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using . . . unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45 (emphasis added). Unfair prac-
tices refer to when companies employ data security practices that cause or are 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers. Deceptive practices refer to when 
companies make materially misleading statements or omit material information 
about their practices (usually on their privacy policies). 
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While the FTC has increased focus on consumer protection,66 its 
power is limited to the enforcement of laws.67 So, while the FTC 
serves as a deterrent by writing privacy guidelines and fining com-
panies, it does so only based on already established statutes.68 
“While the FTC  . . . has attempted to curb harmful practices by data 
brokers  . . . to protect consumers, there is very limited, if any, his-
torical precedent for consumers’ ability to challenge the inappropri-
ate aggregation and disclosure of their personal information.”69 In 
sum, without new legislation, the FTC is limited in its fight to pro-
tect consumers against data theft and data misuse. Consumers af-
fected by data theft or misuse would need to file suit in court to seek 
monetary compensation for any harm caused,70 which means that, 
at least for now, the judicial branch is at the forefront of the data 
privacy issues. 
D. The Unfortunate Role of Constitutional Standing 
As consumers seek redress for data theft and data misuse in 
courts, and without any sign of congressional efforts coming, the 
Supreme Court may find itself in the driver’s seat regarding laws for 
data privacy and protection. It has already spoken on the issue, albeit 
                                                                                                             
 66 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to 
Settle FTC Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s 
Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news–events/press–
releases/2012/08/google–will–pay–225–million–settle–ftc–charges–it–misrepre-
sented. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the FTC, has stated that “[n]o matter how big 
or small, all companies must abide by FTC orders against them and keep their 
privacy promises to consumers, or they will end up paying many times what it 
would have cost to comply in the first place.” Id. Also, recently the FTC increased 
the maximum civil penalty amount from $16,000 to $40,000 for each day of the 
violation. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Raises Civil Penalty Maxi-
mums to Adjust for Inflation (June 29, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news–
events/press–releases/2016/06/ftc–raises–civil–penalty–maximums–adjust–in-
flation. 
 67 See Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2018). 
 68 See Rafae Bhatti, Standing in Privacy Lawsuits: Is the Tide Turning in Fa-
vor of Consumers? 5–6 (March 3, 2016) (unpublished comment), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741514. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. (“The standing to sue . . . is part of an important framework to enable 
individuals allegedly harmed by data brokers to protect their own right of pri-
vacy.”). 
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quite unclearly (as is demonstrated in Parts III and IV), in two cases 
that extended to the privacy sphere: Clapper v. Amnesty Interna-
tional USA71 (a quasi-data theft suit) and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins72 (a 
data misuse suit). 
In both Clapper and Spokeo, the Court gave blurry guidelines 
focused on Article III constitutional standing; specifically, its in-
jury-in-fact requirement.73 This created a circuit split regarding 
standing for both data theft and data misuse cases, with many courts 
unwilling to confer standing for consumer plaintiffs.74 Standing has 
become such an obstacle that a federal magistrate judge has come to 
describe it as the “Kilimanjaro” of data privacy cases.75 
Because of the ensuing circuit splits the Court is likely to again 
find itself in a position to define data privacy rights and liabilities 
going forward—at least until Congress speaks. Because data privacy 
litigation has centered on constitutional standing, Part II provides a 
brief background, especially as it relates to privacy cases. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING REQUIREMENTS AND THE 
CONFUSING INJURY-IN-FACT JURISPRUDENCE 
Brief Background 
The United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal 
courts through Article III’s case and controversy requirement.76 “No 
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our 
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-
court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”77 Where the 
Court finds an actual case or controversy, it gives plaintiffs standing 
                                                                                                             
 71 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 72 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
 73 See infra Parts III, IV. 
 74 See Bhatti, supra note 68, at 4; see also John Biglow, It Stands to Reason: 
An Argument for Article III Standing Based on the Threat of Future Harm in Data 
Breach Litigation, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 943, 943 (2016). 
 75 In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 WL 6248499, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). 
 76 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 
488, 492–93 (2009); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340–41 
(2006). 
 77 Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (citation 
omitted). 
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to sue, which ensures they have “such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy as to warrant [their] invocation of federal-
court jurisdiction . . . .”78 
To establish standing, (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an “in-
jury-in-fact” that is “concrete and particularized”; (2) the plaintiff’s 
injury must be traceable to the defendant’s alleged conduct; and (3) 
the plaintiff’s injury must be likely to be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision.79 This Note focuses solely on the injury-in-fact el-
ement, as it is the focus of standing in privacy cases. 
Injury-In-Fact Requirements and Privacy Suits 
The Supreme Court defined the characteristics of an injury-in-
fact: the injury must be (1) “an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est,” (2) that is “concrete and particularized,” and (3) that is “actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”80 Unfortunately, the 
Court’s prolonged lack of guidance for assessing these requirements 
has caused scholars to critique standing jurisprudence and lower 
courts to produce inconsistent results.81 
The presence of an injury-in-fact is crucial in privacy litigation, 
as it often leads to early dismissals for a lack of standing.82 For data 
theft cases, the main contention is whether the threat of future harm 
is sufficiently imminent.83 A court’s holding on the imminence of 
harm opens or closes the door to plaintiffs who seek compensation 
for the costs of data theft. Such expenses include mitigation costs, 
                                                                                                             
 78 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 204 (1962)). 
 79 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 80 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560). 
 81 See generally Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: 
An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 492 (1974) (sug-
gesting that the standing question should not be injury-in-fact, but cause of ac-
tion); David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 42 
(same). 
 82 See Amanda Fitzsimmons, et al., Seventh Circuit: Victims of Data 
Breaches Have Article III Standing to Litigate Class Action Lawsuits, DLA PIPER 
(July 23, 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/07/
seventh-circuit-victims-of-data-breaches/ (“[A]n overwhelming majority of 
courts have dismissed data breach consumer class actions at the outset due to a 
lack of cognizable injury-in-fact[.]”). 
 83 See infra Part III. 
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like credit monitoring services to protect themselves from fraud,84 
unjust enrichment costs from the overpayment of services that they 
believed would keep their PII secure (e.g., credit monitoring),85 a 
loss in the intrinsic value of their PII,86 or emotional distress caused 
by the threat of harm.87 
For data misuse cases (like Spokeo), courts examine whether an 
injury is sufficiently concrete by looking at whether the violated 
statutory provision is tied to a legally protected interest.88 All of the 
same injuries alleged in data theft cases may apply, in addition to 
the statutory violation possibly being a constitutional harm in and of 
itself.89 
LEGALLY PROTECTED INTERESTS AS A VIOLATION OF THE 
LAW 
Legally protected interests may include common law rights such 
as those established in property, contract, and tort law, as well as 
constitutional rights and statutory rights created by Congress.90 Ab-
sent an acknowledgement by the legal system and “until some 
                                                                                                             
 84 See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, 819 F.3d 963, 964 (2016) 
(plaintiff sought compensation for the time and expense incurred to prevent and 
monitor fraudulent charges after a data breach). 
 85 Plaintiffs allege that they overpaid for services because they paid for a cer-
tain service relying on the idea that such a payment included the adequate security 
of their information. See e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 193, 202 
(D.D.C. 2016) (plaintiffs alleged that the payment they inherently paid in security 
as part of their full payment “[was] not equivalent [to] the security value” actually 
provided). Id. 
 86 Plaintiffs allege that the value of their personal information has decreased 
as a result of a breach or misuse of their information. See e.g., Attias, 2016 WL 
4250232, at *5 (plaintiffs argued that data breach “negatively impacted [the datas] 
value.”). 
 87 See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41–42 (3d Cir. 2011) (plaintiff 
alleged “an increased risk of identity theft, . . . costs to monitor their credit activ-
ity, and . . . emotional distress” as harm) (emphasis added). 
 88 See infra Part IV. 
 89 See Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 994–95 (11th Cir. 
2016) (finding violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as sufficient for 
constitutional harm because it conferred a right to adequate disclosures). 
 90 See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Val. Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) 
(“[T]he right invaded is a legal right,—one of property, one arising out of contract, 
one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers 
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source of law creates a relevant legal interest and a right to bring 
suit,” a factual injury may not typically suffice for standing.91 
With regards to privacy and consumer protection, the question 
becomes whether there exists an “understanding of law”92 sufficient 
to create a legally protected interest in the correct use, adequate pro-
tection, and appropriate dissemination of one’s PII. In other words, 
while Congress and the Supreme Court have acknowledged “the 
right to privacy [as] a personal and fundamental right protected by 
the Constitution of the United States,”93 it remains to be consistently 
determined whether today’s privacy—the protection of personal 
data such as PII—is a legally conferred right. 
CONCRETE AND PARTICULARIZED REQUIREMENT 
Prior to Spokeo, courts tended to treat the concrete and particu-
larized elements as one—now they are separately analyzed.94 Par-
ticularity ties into the idea that federal courts do not owe protection 
to “generalized grievances,” which are injuries “often said to be suf-
fered ‘by all or a large class of citizens.’”95 The generalized griev-
ance doctrine “is based on the notion that if parties seek to redress 
public harms, they must do so via the political branches and not the 
courts.”96 As for the second requirement, the definition of concrete-
ness remains fuddled and is a major point of contention in privacy 
                                                                                                             
a privilege.”) (footnote omitted), abrogated by Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 
211 (2011). 
 91 Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: 
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 639–40 (1999). 
 92 Id. at 641. 
 93 5 § U.S.C. 552(a) (2012). 
 94 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016). 
 95 Ryan Guilds, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances As A 
Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1864 (1996) (quoting 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). “Generalized grievances are a sub-
component of standing doctrine and encompass a set of doctrinal limitations on 
federal court access.” Id. 
 96 Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 
221, 221 (2008). For example, prior cases like Defenders of Wildlife stated that 
for standing purposes, citizens would have to show that they are affected in a 
personal and individual way in the sense that their grievances were not widely 
shared. See Sunstein, supra note 91, at 639–40. This stemmed from the idea that 
“the role of the courts is to protect individual rights, and that when numerous 
people are . . . injured, their remedy is political rather than judicial.” Antonin 
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litigation.97 In theory, concreteness means that an injury must be de 
facto—it “must actually exist” and be “real and not abstract.”98 
ACTUAL OR IMMINENT REQUIREMENT 
Generally, the actual or imminent injury requirement means that 
injuries cannot be speculative or hypothetical.99 However, a threat 
of injury may be sufficient “if the injury is certainly impending.”100 
As with concreteness, the Supreme Court has not provided clear 
guidance as to when a plaintiff crosses the probability threshold for 
risk of harm to become certainly impending. The imminence re-
quired is unknown.101 
To recap, privacy litigation centers around the injury-in-fact re-
quirement of constitutional standing, which is unclear and undevel-
oped. In data theft cases, which invoke Clapper, the focus is on the 
concreteness and imminence of the alleged harm, and in data misuse 
cases, like Spokeo, the focus is also on whether the harm is legally 
cognizable. 
III. CLAPPER’S FAILED ATTEMPT TO DEFINE IMMINENCE IN 
DATA BREACH SUITS 
A Necessary Disclaimer 
This Note deals exclusively with data theft cases where plaintiffs 
allege a risk of future harm absent any other actual harm.102 In other 
                                                                                                             
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (“I suggest that courts need to 
accord greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional requirement 
that the plaintiff’s alleged injury be a particularized one, which sets him apart 
from the citizenry at large.”). In other words, one should turn to Congress for a 
remedy, which in turn can then legislate and, in theory, create standing for indi-
viduals who share any injury. 
 97 See infra Part III. 
 98 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. 
 99 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 100 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013). 
 101 See, e.g., id. at 1142–45 (providing two separate standards for imminence: 
the certainly impending standard and the substantial risk standard). 
 102 Cf. Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Cur-
rent State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 398–99 (2014) (listing 
two classes of data breach cases: Class I cases in which the plaintiff has suffered 
a financial loss stemming from a data breach, and Class II cases in which the 
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words, data theft means just that—data theft without anything more. 
This distinction is made because it is already largely settled that in 
cases of actual misuse of information by hackers, a plaintiff has suf-
fered “ongoing, present, distinct, and palpable harms” sufficient for 
standing.103 On the other hand, federal circuit courts are split on 
whether injuries from data theft alone, which involve future harm or 
preventive measures to avoid future harm, are sufficient for consti-
tutional standing.104 
The Creation of a Circuit Split for Imminence of Harm 
At first, the threat of future harm following data theft seemed 
like it would be sufficient for standing. The Seventh Circuit held in 
Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp,105 a case of first impression, that 
where customers’ names, addresses, social security numbers, 
driver’s license numbers, dates of birth, and other financial infor-
mation were stolen,106 the plaintiffs had standing because of their 
alleged mitigation costs. They had “incurred expenses in order to 
prevent their confidential personal information from being used and 
continue to incur expenses in the future.”107 In Krottner v. Starbucks 
Corp.,108 the Ninth Circuit held similarly that breach victims who 
had their “names, addresses, and social security numbers” stolen al-
leged a future threat of harm.109 
                                                                                                             
plaintiff has taken steps to prevent future harm stemming from a data breach or 
they have alleged that future harm is imminent due to a data breach). This Note 
deals exclusively with “Class II” cases. 
 103 Enslin v. The Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 664 (2015) (finding an 
injury-in-fact where plaintiff alleged theft of funds from his bank accounts, unau-
thorized use of credit cards, and the unauthorized issuance of new credit cards); 
see also In re Target Corp. Data Security Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 
(D. Minn. 2014) (finding plaintiffs to have standing where their credit cards were 
used to make unauthorized purchases). 
 104 See Biglow, supra note 74, at 943. 
 105 499 F.3d 629, 631–34 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 109 Id. at 1143. The court found that the plaintiffs had “alleged a credible threat 
of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their 
unencrypted personal data” that was different from more “conjectural or hypo-
thetical allegations,” such as if, “[p]laintiffs had sued based on the risk that it 
would be stolen at some point in the future.” Id. 
2018] DEFINING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN A DIGITAL WORLD 1045 
 
However, the Third Circuit created a split in Reilly v. Ceridian 
Corp., which denied standing on similar facts.110 The plaintiffs “first 
name[s], last name[s], social security number[s] . . . birth date[s] 
and[] the bank account[s] that [are] used for direct deposit”111 were 
stolen by hackers.112 The court found that “an increased risk of iden-
tity theft . . . costs to monitor their credit activity, and . . . emotional 
distress,” were hypothetical and “attenuated, because [they were] 
dependent on entirely speculative, future actions of an unknown 
third-party.”113 
Clapper as the Answer? 
In 2013, the Supreme Court heard Clapper, which though not 
particularly catered to a data theft setting, would examine the future 
threat of harm—imminence—as to standing.114 The case arose be-
cause Section 1881a of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act al-
lowed the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelli-
gence to acquire intelligence through the surveillance of individuals 
who were not “United States persons.”115 The plaintiffs (U.S. citizen 
attorneys, human rights activists, media organizations, and others) 
alleged that, because they regularly engaged in “international com-
munications with individuals who [were] likely targets of surveil-
lance,” they had to take costly and burdensome measures to protect 
the confidentiality of such communications, which would likely be 
acquired through the Section 1881 protocol. 116 
The Court denied standing because plaintiffs “[did not] demon-
strate [that] the future injury . . . [was] certainly impending and be-
cause they [could not] manufacture standing by incurring costs in 
                                                                                                             
 110 664 F.3d 38, 41–42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. The court explained that the speculation included having to believe that 
the hacker “read, copied, and understood their personal information; . . . intends 
to commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and . . . is able to use 
such information to the detriment of Appellants by making unauthorized transac-
tions in Appellants’ names.” Id. 
 114 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 407–22 (2013). 
 115 Id. at 404–05. 
 116 Id. at 406–07. 
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anticipation of non-imminent harm.”117 Their allegations, the Court 
stated, relied on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”118 
On its face, this was a final blow to data theft consumers who 
also had to take costly precautions to avoid future harm. Many be-
lieved Clapper would end data theft suits solely grounded on future 
harm claims.119 “While Clapper was not a data breach case, its anal-
ysis is particularly applicable in such cases where the plaintiff’s sole 
allegation of harm is that he is in imminent danger of future harm 
by virtue of his identity having been stolen.”120 
The Circuit Split Persists Through the “Substantial Risk” 
Standard 
While various courts agreed with Clapper and quickly dismissed 
claims,121 the Seventh Circuit did not. In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus 
Grp., LLC, it re-established the split when it found standing in a data 
theft case, stating that “Clapper does not . . . foreclose any use what-
soever of future injuries to support Article III standing.”122 In Rem-
ijas, the plaintiffs had their credit card numbers stolen and alleged 
that, because “unreimbursed fraudulent charges and identity theft 
may happen,” they had to incur “necessary” and “immediate pre-
ventative measures.”123 Remijas relied on a lower standard of immi-
nence cited in a footnote in Clapper, which stated that sometimes 
“[the Court] found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the 
harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur 
costs to mitigate or avoid the harm.”124 
                                                                                                             
 117 Id. at 422 (emphasis added). 
 118 Id. at 410. 
 119 See Does Clapper Silence Data Breach Litigation? A Two-Year Retrospec-
tive, INFOLAWGROUP LLP (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.infolawgroup.com/
2015/02/articles/breach-notice/does-clapper-silence-data-breach-litigation-a-
two-year-retrospective/ (discussing the possibility that Clapper could silence data 
breach litigation). 
 120 Torres v. Wendy’s Co., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1283 (M.D. Fla. 2016). 
 121 Most courts, consistent with Clapper, rejected the threat of future harm as 
insufficient. See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 2016 WL 4250232, at *2 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 10, 2016) (finding the risk of harm too speculative); In re Zappos.com, Inc., 
108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 958–59 (D. Nev. 2015). 
 122 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 123 Id. at 692. 
 124 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013) (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Court acknowledged the substantial risk threshold as lower 
2018] DEFINING PRIVACY RIGHTS IN A DIGITAL WORLD 1047 
 
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Remijas from Clapper be-
cause it was not speculative that the theft itself occurred: “[t]he 
hackers deliberately targeted Neiman Marcus to obtain [the plain-
tiffs’] credit-card information.”125 The court asked, “[w]hy else 
would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ 
private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner 
or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ 
identities.”126 The Seventh Circuit reiterated its stance in Lewert v. 
P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, where it held that customers whose 
credit and debit card data was stolen had a concrete injury composed 
of the time and expense spent to prevent and monitor fraudulent 
charges.127 Confusingly, it applied a “certainly impending” stand-
ard.128 
With the Ninth and Seventh Circuits conferring standing and the 
Third Circuit denying it, a split still exists.129 It is also unclear if the 
substantial risk or certainly impending standard applies to data theft. 
Without any legislation on data theft and with continuing confusion 
in the courts, obscurity plagues data theft rights and liabilities. 
IV. SPOKEO FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN ALTERNATE AVENUE FOR 
STANDING 
An Opportunity for Related Clarity 
Clapper left a guidance gap—consumer victims, attorneys, and 
courts could not predictably gauge whether post-data theft risk of 
harm was sufficiently imminent for standing. Consequently, these 
parties anticipated that Spokeo—which considered the related ques-
tion of whether a plaintiff could overcome a standing challenge 
                                                                                                             
than certainly impending by stating that “[Clapper] respondents [fell] short of 
even that standard.” Id. 
 125 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
 126 Id. 
 127 819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 128 The “increased risk of fraudulent credit- or debit-card charges, and the in-
creased risk of identity theft” were “certainly impending” future harms. Id. at 966. 
 129 Compare id. (conferring standing), and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 658 
F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010) (conferring standing), with Reilly v. Ceridian 
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying standing). 
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solely on a company’s violation of a consumer protection stat-
ute130—could offer assistance. Spokeo could potentially allow vic-
tims of data misuse and some victims of data theft (if there was a 
statutory violation involved as well) to seek redress in federal courts 
through a different avenue, that of statutorily conferred standing.131 
The Creation of the Concreteness Conundrum 
Spokeo arose when Thomas Robins, the named plaintiff, discov-
ered an inaccurate profile of himself on Spokeo, a consumer report-
ing agency that operates a search engine.132 Spokeo gathers data 
about people and creates a profile of them.133 Robins’ profile falsely 
asserted that he was married (he was not), had children (he did not), 
was in his late 50s (he was younger), had a job (he was looking for 
one), was affluent (he was not), and held a graduate degree (he did 
not).134 He filed suit alleging, among other claims, that Spokeo vio-
lated the FCRA by failing to “follow reasonable procedures to en-
sure maximum possible accuracy [of information].”135 The harm, he 
alleged, was that the inaccurate profile caused him to miss out on 
employment opportunities because it “made him appear overquali-
fied . . . expectant of a higher salary . . .  and less mobile . . . .”136 
In its analysis, the Court focused exclusively on the particulari-
zation and concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact analysis.137 The 
Court held that Robins’ claims were particularized, without much 
                                                                                                             
 130 Brandon N. Robinson & Gregory C. Cook, One Month Later: Reflections 
On the Impact of Spokeo, LAW360 (June 20, 2016), https://www.law360.com/ar-
ticles/807734/one-month-later-reflections-on-the-impact-of-spokeo (“The much 
anticipated question that the court was asked to address revolved around whether 
Robins could bring a claim under the FCRA based solely on the publishing of 
inaccurate information alone, without evidence of any actual injury.”). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544–46 (2016). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 1546. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 137 Id. at 1546–47 (majority opinion). 
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discussion.138 Regarding concreteness, the Court remanded the anal-
ysis back to the Ninth Circuit.139 In dictum, it provided limited guid-
ance by stating that an injury must be de facto—it “must actually 
exist” and be “real and not abstract.”140 Concrete is “not necessarily 
synonymous with ‘tangible.’”141 
Most importantly, it stated that courts should look at history and 
congressional judgment to determine concreteness.142 Regarding 
history, courts must consider if the “intangible harm has a close re-
lationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing 
basis for a lawsuit.”143 Regarding congressional judgment, Congress 
is “well positioned to identify intangible harms” and may elevate the 
status of an injury to “concrete” by conferring statutory rights.144 
But, the Court also provided the conflicting view that a “bare proce-
dural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” does not satisfy 
the injury-in-fact requirement.145 Even more confusing, the Court 
also wrote that in some circumstances, “the violation of a procedural 
right granted by statute can be sufficient . . . to constitute injury-in-
                                                                                                             
 138 See id. at 1548. Because Spokeo violated his statutory rights and because 
he had a personal interest in the handling of his credit information, the Court found 
his injury sufficiently particularized. Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 1549 (providing that, for example, the risk of real harm is an intangi-
ble harm that may satisfy concreteness). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id.; see, e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat. Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 775–77 (2000) (justifying Article III standing for a “qui tam relator 
[claim] under the False Claims Act” because qui tam actions were historically 
prevalent in America and England). 
 144 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544. 
 145 Id. As an example, the Court explains that while Congress sought to stop 
the “dissemination of false information” by enacting the FCRA and adopting pro-
cedures such as the one allegedly violated by Spokeo, a “bare procedural violation 
[of the FCRA]” would not satisfy Article III because it may result in no harm. Id. 
at 1550 (“not all inaccuracies [by FCRA regulated agencies] cause harm or pre-
sent any material risk of harm”). “It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination 
of an incorrect zip code . . . could work any concrete harm.” Id. 
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fact,”146 and a plaintiff does not have to allege “additional harm be-
yond the one Congress has identified.”147 
In short, Spokeo left an unclear understanding of concreteness 
and failed to state whether a congressional statute ordering compa-
nies to safeguard or display PII in certain ways is sufficient for 
standing. The Court merely provided history and congressional 
judgment as talking points for concreteness (without actually doing 
the analysis itself) and vaguely differentiated between procedural 
and substantive statutory violations. 
A Post-Spokeo Circuit Split 
Spokeo’s lack of clarity resulted in a brewing circuit split—the 
case has “produced divergent decisions in cases with similar fact 
patterns.”148 It remains unclear whether a mere statutory violation is 
sufficient for standing in privacy claims.149 While the Eleventh Cir-
cuit and the D.C. Circuit demonstrated an expansive view of Spokeo 
(conferring standing), the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, 
showed a restrictive view (denying standing).150 As demonstrated 
                                                                                                             
 146 Id. (emphasis added). 
 147 Id.; see, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998) 
(confirming that a group of voters’ “inability to obtain information” that Congress 
had decided to make public is sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy Article III). 
 148 Allison Grande, Spokeo Split: How High Court’s Ruling is Being Inter-
preted, LAW360 (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/865734/
spokeo-split-how-high-court-s-ruling-is-being-interpreted. 
 149 David Lender, et al., A Circuit Split Emerges As Lower Courts Weigh In 
On Spokeo, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/839978/
a-circuit-split-emerges-as-lower-courts-weigh-in-on-spokeo. 
 150 See Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 991–92 (11th Cir. 
2016) (conferring standing where, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act, the plaintiff received a letter by the defendant that omitted certain stat-
utorily required disclosures causing plaintiff to get “very angry” and “cr[y] a 
lot.”); see also Galaria v. Nat’l Mutual Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 385 (6th Cir. 
2016) (conferring standing in a data breach case where the plaintiff alleged an 
FCRA violation). But see Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 513–
15 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (defendant’s violation of the D.C. Consumer Identification 
Information Act and the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act by requesting 
customers’ zip codes in connection with credit card purchases is not a concrete 
Article III injury); see also Braitberg v. Charter Comm., Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930–
31 (8th Cir. 2016) (defendant’s cable company’s retention of personal information 
in violation of Cable Communications Policy Act does not merit standing without 
some other harm); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 728–
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by the following chart (Chart 1) compiled by attorneys at Morgan 
Lewis & Bockius LLP, after Spokeo, courts have inconsistently de-
termined standing founded on consumer protection statutes (even in 















FDCPA 24 3 27 89% 
TCPA 23 6 29 79% 
Other 36 30 66 55% 
TOTAL 105 68 173 61% 
 
While it may be that this split is due in part to the different nature 
and factual requirements of statutes, the courts’ differing analyses 
demonstrate that there is more than just a factual inconsistency 
within these cases. While courts often employed the historical and 
congressional intent analysis suggested by Spokeo,152 they have car-
ried it out in a highly inconsistent manner, leading to unpredictable 
results. The following subsections explain how courts have been ap-
plying each prong. 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS INCONSISTENCIES 
Courts with an expansive view of Spokeo (that conferred stand-
ing) typically make it a point to recognize the right to privacy as a 
traditional common law cause of action.153 This recognition alone 
                                                                                                             
29 (7th Cir. 2016) (the sole failure to truncate a credit card’s expiration date as 
required by FACTA is insufficient to confer Article III standing). 
 151 Ezra D. Church, et al., Spokeo 6 Months Later: An Undeniably Dramatic 
Impact, LAW360 (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/839978/
spokeo-6-months-later-an-undeniably-dramatic-impact. 
 152 See, e.g., Holderread v. Ford Motor Credit Co., LLC, 2016 WL 6248707, 
at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2016) (“As directed by Spokeo, the Court should first 
consider the history of the intangible harm and Congress’s judgment.”). 
 153 See Matera v. Google Inc., 2016 WL 5339806, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 
2016) (finding that, for centuries, common law had recognized the right to pri-
vacy, which the Wiretap Act sought to protect); see also Yershov v. Gannet Sat-
ellite Info. Network, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 353, 362 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding that 
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bolsters the strength of the statutory provision that has been violated 
because it alludes to something that the Supreme Court has recog-
nized for standing in the past. On the other hand, courts that have 
rejected standing do not acknowledge the right to privacy as a cause 
of action.154 Nevertheless, this is vaguely and arbitrarily applied. 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT INCONSISTENCIES 
Courts have had difficulty differentiating between statutorily 
created procedural and substantive rights. While Spokeo clearly 
stated that virtually155 all procedural violations are insufficient for 
standing, it only provided one example of what would qualify as a 
procedural right: the correct dissemination of a zip code as required 
by the FCRA.156 As a consequence, lower courts have either merely 
compared the statutory provision in question to the dissemination of 
an incorrect zip code, or just assumed conclusively that a right is 
substantive or procedural.157 The former method is inefficient be-
cause the FCRA’s correct zip code requirement does not establish 
much of a guidepost,158 and the latter method because it serves no 
precedential purpose. 
                                                                                                             
the VPPA protected “an individual’s right to privacy . . . as to certain personal 
information and private locations,” which had long been regarded as a basis for a 
lawsuit) (emphasis added); Aranda v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 
3d 850, 857–58 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (finding the TCPA codifies the common law tort 
of right to privacy and seclusion). 
 154 See, e.g., Hancock, 830 F.3d at 511 (right to privacy not acknowledged). 
 155 In some cases, such as FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), standing was 
merited with a mere procedural violation. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
1549 (2016). Akins involved “statutory rights intended to protect and promote 
public interests”—citizens’ right to information that should have been publicly 
disclosed about candidates running for public office. Id. 
 156 The Court stated that dissemination of an incorrect zip code may violate 
the FCRA, but that it is “difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect 
zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1550. 
 157 See Hancock, 830 F.3d at 511; see also Braitberg v. Charter Comm., Inc., 
836 F.3d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 158 The only time this works well is when the case deals with extremely similar 
provisions as Spokeo, such as Hancock. 830 F.3d at 512. There, the defendant 
violated D.C.’s Consumer Identification Information Act by requesting zip codes 
from plaintiffs during credit card purchases, and the court found that plaintiffs 
“assert[ed] only a bare violation of the requirements.” Id. 
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Furthermore, courts have inconsistent ways of distinguishing 
cases using Spokeo’s zip code example: some use the prohibitive 
language of a statute as a key to finding substantive rights,159 and 
others equate procedural rights to duties.160 Other cases, like Matera 
v. Google Inc.,161 demonstrate how some courts apply an arbitrary 
and conclusive analysis to distinguishing between a procedural and 
a substantive right of action. There, the plaintiff alleged that Google 
violated the Wire Tap Act because it unlawfully intercepted the con-
tents of Gmail messages.162 Without giving much explanation, the 
court found that the Wire Tap Act created a substantive right of ac-
tion.163 This is not the only time that a court has employed this type 
of conclusory analysis.164 
                                                                                                             
 159 See Aranda v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 850, 857 (N.D. 
Ill. 2016). There, the court conferred standing, by distinguishing a TCPA provi-
sion based on the fact that it “prohibit[ed] making certain kinds of telephonic con-
tact” without consumers’ consent, instead of “requiring the adoption of proce-
dures to decrease congressionally-identified risks.” Id. The court stated that, un-
like where an agency violates the FCRA by reporting an incorrect zip code (and, 
thus, the “procedural rights . . . are attenuated enough from the interests Congress 
identified and sought to protect through the FCRA”), “the TCPA section at issue 
does not require the adoption of procedures to decrease congressionally-identified 
risks.” Id. Instead, it “prohibits making certain kinds of telephonic contact” with-
out consumers’ consent. Id. 
 160 See Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 931. There, the court equated procedural rights 
to duties and denied standing on the basis that the right was procedural because it 
created a duty. See id. (stating that “FCRA . . . provides that consumer reporting 
agencies must ‘follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accu-
racy’ of consumer reports.”). The plaintiff alleged that defendant, his ex-cable 
provider, violated the Cable Communications Policy Act when it kept his PII after 
he canceled the service. Id. at 927. The court found that a bare procedural right—
the duty to destroy PII—was insufficient for standing. Id. 
 161 2016 WL 5339806, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23. 2016). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. It merely stated that while the dissemination of an incorrect zip code 
violated a “reasonable [FCRA] procedure,” the Wiretap Act created “substantive 
rights to privacy in one’s communications.” 
 164 See Yershov v. Gannet Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 3d 353, 
362 n.5 (D. Mass. 2016) (conclusively stating that the VPPA created a “substan-
tive right to prevent and remedy” the type of disclosure performed by Gannet); 
Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., 654 F. App’x 990, 991–92 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(conclusively finding a substantive right to receive disclosures without additional 
explanation). 
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Even worse, some courts, like the Seventh Circuit in Meyers v. 
Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, do not distinguish between proce-
dural and substantive rights and just make a blanket assumption that 
standing requires an additional injury to the statutory violation.165 
Through all of these different methods, courts—unsurprisingly—
have interpreted the same statutes and ended up with opposite hold-
ings on standing.166 
COURTS IGNORE THE SPOKEO ANALYSIS AND MAINTAIN THE 
STATUS QUO 
Finally, some courts forego the statutory analysis suggested by 
Spokeo and confer standing solely on the imminence of harm (under 
the Clapper analysis).167 It is as if Spokeo did not change any-
thing.168 One district court even claimed that Spokeo “essentially af-
firmed” the intangible injury requirements set forth in Clapper.169 
In sum, Clapper and Spokeo have done very little, if anything, 
to help define privacy rights and liabilities. So, why has the Supreme 
Court been so vague? 
                                                                                                             
 165 843 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2016). There, the court denied standing because 
consumers showed no actual injury other than that the defendant had failed to 
properly truncate credit card expiration dates in accordance with the Fair and Ac-
curate Credit Transactions Act. See id. (stating that “Congress enacted the 
FACTA in response to what it considered to be the increasing threat of identity 
theft.”). The court concluded that regardless of whether the right was substantive 
or procedural, its violation required an accompanying injury. Id. at 728–29. 
 166 See Church, supra note 151 and accompanying Chart 1. 
 167 In re Zappos.com, a data breach case, is an example. In re Zappos.com, 
Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2016 WL 4521681, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 
29, 2016). There, the court denied standing, claiming that plaintiffs did not suffer 
actual damages as a result of the breach. Id. at *3. On the other hand, in Galaria, 
another data breach case, the court conferred standing based on the imminent risk 
of the harm and remanded the FCRA claim (ignoring the Spokeo analysis). Galaria 
v. Nat’l Mutual Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 391–93 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 168 U.S. District Judge James Donato said that he was “skeptical that . . . 
Spokeo . . . was a ‘big change of law.’” Dorothy Atkins, Facebook’s Spokeo Bid 
to End Privacy Suit Faces Skepticisim, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/856826/facebook-s-spokeo-bid-to-end-pri-
vacy-suit-faces-skepticism. He further stated, “‘[i]t’s old law simply restated . . . 
[and] [t]here’s nothing particularly novel about it.’” Id. 
 169 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 2016 WL 4521681, at *1. 
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V. WHY SO SILENT: THE DIFFICULTY OF ASSIGNING LIABILITY IN 
DATA PRIVACY 
It may well be that Congress is yet to legislate and that the Court 
may have erred on the side of being vague (in both Spokeo and Clap-
per) because of the impending policy implications attached to any 
decisive move related to data privacy. It is important to understand 
what is at stake and why assigning rights and liabilities is so difficult 
in the privacy space: if consumers can earn standing easily, a flood-
gate may open, and if it is too hard for them to earn standing, one of 
their last few avenues for redress may be closed. 
The Problem of the Disappearing Culprit 
What makes privacy cases so complicated and difficult to ad-
dress is that hackers—the truly liable criminals—are virtually never 
caught.170 Many times “cybergangs” can complete remote work 
through “zombie computers,” which makes it increasingly difficult 
to locate the hackers.171 As cybercrime costs quadrupled from 2013 
to 2015 (and continue to increase),172 cyber attackers continue un-
caught. 
Who Should Take the Hit: Consumers or Companies? 
Unable to sue the culprits, both companies and consumers must 
turn elsewhere for redress. If companies implement its security sys-
tem through a certified vendor, they may be able to sue such ven-
dor.173 Also, companies sometimes buy cyber insurance to lower the 
costs of a breach.174 On the other hand, consumers may try to sue 
                                                                                                             
 170 James Andrew Lewis, the Senior Vice President and Director at Center for 
Strategic International Studies, and an ex-Foreign Service officer, stated that 
“most cybercriminals . . . and the most successful ones are not caught . . . [and] 
so far there is impunity for cybercriminals.” See Tom Risen, supra note 42. 
 171 Elinor Mills, Finjan Finds Botnet of 1.9 million Infected Computers, CNET 
(Apr. 21, 2009), https://www.cnet.com/news/finjan-finds-botnet-of-1-9-million-
infected-computers/. 
 172 See Morgan, supra note 4. 
 173 Kristin Casler, Data Breach Defenses When Consumer Plaintiffs Come 
Knocking, LEXISNEXIS (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/communi-
ties/corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2016/08/15/data-breach-de-
fenses-when-consumer-plaintiffs-come-knocking.aspx. 
 174 Id. 
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the company—the custodian of their PII—but may encounter con-
stitutional standing obstacles.175 This is because constitutional 
standing is the “first avenue of defense” for defendant companies.176 
Regardless of the varying potential scenarios, from a legislative 
and judicial standpoint, any future laws or court decisions will es-
sentially decide how to spread liability between consumers and 
companies. Keeping in mind the respective availability for redress, 
this Note now examines the policy implications of privacy legisla-
tion and jurisprudence. As an introduction, consider the following: 
When it comes to protection of online privacy, you 
will probably hear the claim that some measures, if 
implemented, would prevent innovation or destroy 
the Internet altogether. You will also hear the claim 
that without protective measures we will . . . end up 
with a society that sees people as nothing more than 
consumers.177 
CONSUMER RISKS AND FRIGHT IN A DATA DRIVEN SOCIETY 
One could argue that laws should shift liability away from con-
sumers and instead protect them because of the urgent threat of iden-
tity theft and other consumer harms caused by data theft and made 
more likely by data misuse. By providing PII to companies, consum-
ers risk their financial stability, their identity, and potentially even 
their mental or physical safety.178 For the fifteenth consecutive year, 
                                                                                                             
 175 Maria Vathis & David Zetoony, The Cybersecurity Question: To Insure Or 
Not To Insure, LAW360 (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/
481543/the-cybersecurity-question-to-insure-or-not-to-insure. 
 176 Gerald D. Silver, Tips For Defending Data Breach Class Actions, LAW360 
(Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/421934/tips-for-defending-
against-data-breach-class-actions. A dismissal means consumers may no longer 
argue on the merits nor seek redress for harms. Id. 
 177 Irina Raicu, Are Attitudes about Privacy Changing?, MARKKULA CTR. FOR 
APPLIED ETHICS (June 1, 2012), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/privacy/are-attitudes-
about-privacy-changing/ [hereinafter Attitudes]. 
 178 See M. GRANGER MORGAN, ET AL., THE MANY MEANINGS OF “SMART 
GRID” 5 (2009), http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&
context=epp. For instance, a hacker could monitor Smart Grid power usage to 
determine when a consumer is at work, facilitating burglary, unauthorized entry, 
or worse. Id. See also Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and 
Thirty-Two Technical Experts and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting 
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identity theft is the top complaint among consumers.179 In 2012 
alone, more than sixteen-million Americans fell victim to identity 
thefts, costing over twenty-four-billion dollars—fourteen-billion 
dollars more than losses attributed to burglary, theft, automobile 
theft, and all other property crimes.180 Without adequate company 
safeguards, hackers can “collect[] consumer profiles that would give 
them a clear picture of consumers’ habits over time, thereby ena-
bling them to predict passwords, challenge questions, or other au-
thentication credentials.”181 
While companies may lose money (and in some scenarios, cor-
porate livelihood) from misused or stolen information, individual 
victims risk a value unique to them because they face “special 
threats to [their] ability to structure their lives in unconventional 
ways.”182 Privacy incursions can cause uniquely detrimental and ir-
reparable effects on individuals.183 Research in cognitive psychol-
ogy shows that a “lack of privacy stunts social development and 
growth, neither of which is fungible or replaceable in human be-
ings.”184 
Furthermore, consumers’ right to privacy includes the right to 
manage and control their personal data, which helps “individuals 
                                                                                                             
Respondent at 5, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339) 
[hereinafter Brief for EPIC] (“Many consumers are unable to obtain jobs or credit 
because of inaccurate or incomplete information made available by data bro-
kers.”). 
 179 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Identity Theft Tops FTC’s Consumer 
Complaint Categories Again in 2014 (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2015/02/identity-theft-tops-ftcs-consumer-complaint-cate-
gories-again-2014. 
 180 See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Stat., 16.6 Million People Experienced 
Identity Theft in 2012 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/
vit12pr.cfm. 




 182 Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117, 
2121 (2001). 
 183 See Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 52, 54 (2007). 
 184 Brief for EPIC, supra note 178 (citing Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: 
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 
n.195 (2000)). 
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avoid the embarrassment that accompanies the disclosure of certain 
personal details”; “to preserve human dignity, respect, and auton-
omy”; and “[to] construct intimacy with others.”185 This line of 
thinking is tied to a control theory, which conceptualizes privacy as 
“the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others.”186 It follows that companies are in a 
better position to protect that control because they are the custodians 
of private information.187 Therefore, the company in possession 
should bear the consequences of data misuse or theft.188 
The FTC has stated that there is a power imbalance between cus-
tomers and the companies with which they conduct business, espe-
cially for companies offering important services such as utilities, 
which leaves consumers relatively disempowered and without 
meaningful choice.189 Others take a step further, arguing that the 
collection of PII facilitates a company’s power to influence or direct 
consumer behavior.190 “The ability of a company—a company that 
you have no relationship with—to know where you live, your de-
                                                                                                             
 185 Id. (citing Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1212–16, 1260 (1998)). 
 186 Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstand-
ings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 766 (2007) (explaining “the control 
we have over information about ourselves” and the importance of maintaining that 
control to avoid resulting in “a suffocating powerlessness and vulnerability” from 
its loss). 
 187 See Bruce Schneier, When It Comes to Security, We’re Back to Feudalism, 
WIRED (Nov. 26, 2012) https://www.wired.com/2012/11/feudal-security/ (“We 
give companies our data and trust them with our security, but we receive very few 
assurances of protection in return, and those companies have very few restrictions 
on what they can do.”). 
 188 Id. 
 189 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF 
RAPID CHANGE 51 (2012), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyre-
port.pdf. Typically, the business-consumer relationship is already relatively one-
sided. For example, for important services, contracts are typically dictated and 
may be changed at will by companies. Id. 
 190 See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1934, 1953 (2013). 
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mographics, your interests, and how to contact you is unprece-
dented.”191 To summarize the arguments against precluding con-
sumers from redress: 
None of this is acceptable because it allocates the risk 
of loss to consumers even though they are in no po-
sition to prevent the breach and allows the merchant 
to escape liability in proximately-caused harms even 
though it has the power and resources to minimize 
the risk of these breaches.192 
CORPORATE LENIENCY FOR INNOVATION AND FAIRNESS 
There are also strong arguments for corporate leniency, includ-
ing the protection of innovation, the level of sophistication of mod-
ern hackers, the difficulty of making changes so quickly, and the 
already costly repercussions for victim companies. First, as the role 
of Congress and the Supreme Court “remains central to defining and 
reshaping the contours of privacy rights and remedies,”193 many tech 
executives like Scott McNealy, who famously proclaimed that 
“[people] have zero privacy” and that people should “get over it,”194 
may urge for corporate leniency for the sake of innovation.195 In 
other words, holding companies to a high security compliance stand-
ard would be costly and hinder innovation efforts. Therefore, law-
making bodies should consider the harmful repercussions that could 
                                                                                                             
 191 Jeff Jonas, The Surveillance Society and Transparent You, in PRIVACY IN 
THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 93, 98 (Marc Rotenberg, Julia 
Horwitz, & Jeramie Scott eds., 2015). 
 192 Adam Lamparello, Online Data Breaches, Standing, and the Third-Party 
Doctrine, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 119, 127. 
 193 LAW BUS. RESEARCH LTD, THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND 
CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 288 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 2014), 
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/files/publications/2014/11/the-privacy-data-
protection-and-cybersecurity-la__/files/united-states/fileattachment/united-
states.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY]. 
 194 Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It,’ WIRED, (Jan. 26, 1999), 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. 
 195 See Attitudes, supra note 177 (“[Y]ou will probably hear the claim that 
some measures, if implemented, would prevent innovation[.]”). 
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follow from broadening privacy rights, which are integrated with the 
United States’ economy and technological initiatives.196 
Next, it may be unfair to fault companies that are unable to pro-
tect themselves against highly sophisticated hackers. Today’s 
cyberattacks “are more stealthy and malicious than ever before . . . . 
[and] are programmed to remain unnoticed for as long as possi-
ble . . . .”197 Hackers are no longer “attention-seeking geeks” but 
instead “part of a highly specialized and distributed criminal ecol-
ogy.”198 This new level of sophistication can reach any organization 
from large technology companies (like Yahoo) to the Federal Re-
serve.199 The threat applies to small businesses as well (who often 
make the mistake of thinking they will not be hacked).200 If the best 
and most protected organizations are having trouble keeping up with 
current “inevitable”201 breaches, then it is likely that small busi-
nesses and innovative startup companies may be even further be-
hind.202 Assuming courts lower the standing threshold, these smaller 
                                                                                                             
 196 PRIVACY, supra note 193, at v (“[T]he frenetic conversion of the global 
economy to an increasingly digital, internet-driven model is also stimulating a 
rapid change in privacy, data protection and cybersecurity laws and regulations.”). 
 197 Data Breach Threat Analysis, SWORD & SHIELD, https://www.sword-
shield.com/security-assessments/data-breach-threat-analysis/ (last visited Feb. 
13, 2018). 
 198 Lance Cottrell, Today’s Hackers Are Way More Sophisticated Than You 
Think, READWRITE (Feb. 4, 2015) http://readwrite.com/2015/02/04/sophisti-
cated-hackers-defense-in-depth/. 
 199 Cf. Robert E. Sumner, IV & Mindy L. Vervais, The Typical Data Breach 
Lawsuit and How to Protect Your Company, INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/10/01/the-typical-data-breach-lawsuit-and-
how-to-protect (“It has been said that there are two types of companies: those that 
have experienced a data breach and those that know they have experienced a data 
breach.”). 
 200 Dennis Milewski, Survey Shows Small Businesses Have Big Data Breach 
Exposure, MUNICH RE (Mar. 6, 2013). The Ponemon Institue found in a 2013 
study that 55% of small businesses surveyed experienced a data breach. Id. 
 201 See Casler, supra note 173. 
 202 See Penny Crosman, New York Rewriting Cybersecurity Rules After 
Banker Pushback, AM. BANKER (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.american-
banker.com/news/new-york-rewriting-cybersecurity-rules-after-banker-
pushback. While larger companies may be able to adapt to new regulations, and 
in turn new liabilities, smaller companies may have a harder time adjusting to the 
requirements. As an example, consider a New York proposal to increase regula-
tion thresholds on encryption for banks, to which many bank groups voiced con-
cerns that, “[s]mall banks have much more limited resources than their larger bank 
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entities “[would be] at a greater risk of going out of business because 
of the litigation” costs,203 potentially hindering innovation. 
Third, and related to the prior point, companies may need more 
time to adapt their security methods to the heightening cybersecurity 
threats. For example, at least as it pertains to healthcare companies 
(42.5% of which were breached last year), technology is outdated 
and there is a short supply of qualified professionals (e.g., security 
engineers), making it difficult for companies to make quick changes 
and to hire the adequate people.204 Similarly, “[t]raditional anti-vi-
rus/anti-malware vendors continue to lag behind online crimi-
nals”205 and “IT teams need more robust intelligence, protection, 
and remediation to protect their data from breach or loss.”206 Law-
making institutions have to understand what is actually possible. 
These changes are not going to happen overnight, and Congress and 
the judicial branch must be weary of making it too costly (through 
increased compliance standards or easy consumer protection suits) 
for companies to transition to adequate protection measures.207 
Finally, one could argue that the status quo may be sufficient to 
effectuate change because business and legal enforcement costs al-
ready push companies to improve security and compliance 
measures. Even without successful consumer suits or new security 
compliance regulations, data breaches already cost companies 
enough money to incentivize them to take measures to avoid future 
breaches.208 Each data breach costs companies an average of $5.85 
                                                                                                             
brethren, therefore should not be made to meet all the same requirements . . . .” 
Id. 
 203 See Casler, supra note 173. 
 204 See Tim Cannon, The Root of the Problem: How to Prevent Security 
Breaches, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2015/02/the-root-of-the-secu-
rity-problem/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). This article also offers investing in ed-
ucation (to account for qualified professional shortage) as a solution to data breach 
problems, thereby implying that no short-term solution is available. Id. 
 205 Data Breach Threat Analysis, supra note 199. 
 206 Netskope, supra note 40. 
 207 See John Nadolenco & Evan M. Wooten, Lack of Standing in Data Privacy 
Cases: Not Just A Federal Court Defense, MAYER BROWN (July 31, 2014), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/de/Lack-of-Standing-in-Data-Privacy-Cases? 
(claiming that privacy cases have “particularly . . . high costs of discovery and 
potential exposure”). 
 208 See John Stringer, Protecting Personally Identifiable Information: What 
Data Is at Risk and What You Can do About It, SOPHOS 3 (Oct. 2011), 
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million, according to the Ponemon Institute.209 Among this figure, 
the average cost of defense of a data breach lawsuit comes out to 
$574,984 and the average settlement to $258,099.210 International 
scholars have admired the United States’ current privacy enforce-
ment structure: 
Taken together, this enforcement ecosystem has 
proven to be nimble, flexible, and effective in adapt-
ing to rapidly changing technological developments 
and practices, responding to evolving consumer and 
citizen expectations, and serving as a meaningful 
agent of deterrence and accountability. Indeed, the 
US enforcement and litigation-based approach ap-
pears to be particularly well suited to deal with ‘re-
cent inventions and business methods’– namely, new 
technologies and modes of commerce – that pose 
ever changing opportunities and unpredictable pri-
vacy challenges.211 
Further, these same scholars have also stated that the United 
States had “success of enforcement in pushing corporate privacy 
managers . . . to develop state-of-the-art privacy practices . . . .”212 
They attribute the proactive development of privacy policies and 
standards to the “constant threat and unpredictability of future en-
forcement by the FTC and parallel state consumer protection offi-
cials, combined with the deterrent effect of enforcement actions 
against peer companies . . . .”213 As a result of this dynamic, accept-
ing this line of thinking would put a lesser burden on the judicial 
branch to resolve its privacy standing circuit splits and on Congress 
to legislate. 
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 209 See Sumner & Vervais, supra note 199. 
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VI. PRIVACY LAWS, RIGHTS, AND LIABILITIES: WHERE DO WE 
GO FROM HERE? 
“Concern about over-regulating in the private sector” has been 
acknowledged as a reason why Congress has been slow to act, and 
the judicial branch may be doing the same.214 Despite these con-
cerns, something must be done. We have been in this situation be-
fore. In 1890, when Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis de-
fined privacy for the first time as the “right to be let alone,” they 
recognized the “new right[]” because it needed to “grow[] to meet 
the demands of society.”215 Just as the “[r]ecent inventions and busi-
ness methods” called for changes then,216 the demands of society 
today—the digitization of the persona and constant exchange, use, 
and loss of PII—call for changes now. 
Congress (mainly) and the Supreme Court have the power and 
responsibility to define the limits of these new rights and of the re-
dress available for these unique and unprecedented harms. They 
must give clarity to consumers, companies, and everyone else af-
fected by privacy issues—specifically in cases of data theft and data 
misuse. In doing so, they must try to balance the interests of con-
sumers (availability of redress in a situation where companies have 
the most bargaining power and control of data) and companies 
(needing adequate time to improve security and latitude to continue 
driving innovation).217 
Final Thoughts on Data Theft Situations and the Supreme 
Court’s Role 
Regarding data theft cases, Congress has not provided any 
breach compliance and notification legislation, and, in the courts, 
there is inconsistency over whether the risk of harm is enough for 
Article III standing.218 However, because cybersecurity breaches are 
                                                                                                             
 214 Id. at 268–70. 
 215 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 193–95 (1890) (“For years there has been a feeling that the law must 
afford some remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private per-
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 217 See supra Part V. 
 218 See supra Part III. As discussed earlier, because of the Supreme Court’s 
unclear guidance to date, federal courts differ on whether the certainly impending 
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technical, sophisticated, and difficult to understand without the 
proper background,219 Congress may be more prepared to provide 
guidance. It is likely that, because of the complexity of data privacy 
rights, the Supreme Court is waiting on Congress to act, as it should 
have by now. However, if given the opportunity, the Supreme Court 
should, at the very least, clarify its analysis for determining data 
theft harms as sufficient for standing. 
To start, the Court should determine whether the certainly im-
pending or substantial risk standard applies to data theft suits. The 
substantial risk standard is a lower threshold of imminence than the 
certainly impending standard.220 Remijas applied a substantial risk 
standard and conferred standing. 221 The Seventh Circuit explained 
that hackers steal information with a fraudulent intent of using it for 
a crime, and this in itself is a sufficient substantial risk.222 Though 
Remijas’ logic and holding may be deemed too tough on compa-
nies—especially because of the inevitable nature of data breaches—
by either supporting or denying this as the standard (as opposed to 
the certainly impending standard), the Supreme Court will steer the 
lower courts to apply and develop one standard. Having one stand-
ard will at least narrow the discussion and hopefully, help establish 
a factual pattern that serves as precedent. That is, until Congress de-
cides to legislate. 
The Court could also provide guiding factors that take into ac-
count the policy implications of conferring standing (or not) in data 
theft cases. Courts should at least consider what sort of information 
was stolen and whether there is any presence of actual misuse of the 
stolen data. In other words, it should matter factually what type of 
information hackers steal. This Note does not explore the different 
types of PII and the comparable risks of it being stolen, but it seems 
logical that there should be a difference between one’s email address 
                                                                                                             
standard or the substantial risk standard applies; whether the inherent fraudulent 
intent of hackers is enough, or if something more is needed, to get a claim from 
merely speculative to imminent; and consequently, whether to acknowledge post-
breach mitigation costs as reasonable or as manufactured harm. In other words, 
constitutional standing in privacy cases is a mess. 
 219 See supra Part II. 
 220 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013). 
 221 See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015); Clapper, 568 U.S. at 407. 
 222 See Remijas, 794 F. 3d at 693. 
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being stolen versus one’s credit card information being stolen. In 
general, it seems courts fear acknowledging harms (such as credit 
monitoring services, credit card changes, etc.) as sufficient for 
standing because of the risk that doing so would set precedent for 
letting plaintiffs manufacture standing. Focusing on the type of in-
formation stolen would help filter and keep plaintiffs from manu-
facturing standing.  
The more dangerous the type of information stolen, the more 
reasonable for a consumer to respond, and therefore, the more rea-
sonable for him or her to have access to the court system to seek 
redress. For example, buying credit reporting services has been 
acknowledged as an adequate response to stolen credit card num-
bers.223 If the threats arising from a stolen credit card are more im-
minent than with a stolen email address, then this should be a con-
sideration that goes to the imminence of the harm. Additionally, this 
would probably incentivize companies to categorize and minimize 
the type and amount of data that they collect and keep, thereby re-
ducing the risk for both consumers and companies.224 
Also, the Court should take into account whether any other 
plaintiff class members’ stolen PII has been misused.225 If the credit 
cards or social security numbers of other class members have been 
used without their authority, then that may serve as proof of immi-
nent harm.226 This may have made a difference in Remijas, where 
out of 350,000 exposed credit card numbers, 9,200 were known to 
have been used fraudulently at the time of suit.227 Other possible 
policy considerations, such as the timing of the breach and of sub-
sequent notification to consumers could be considered as well. In 
                                                                                                             
 223 See id. at 694. (the victims [received] free credit monitoring and identity 
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theory, this would be favorable to companies that notify users 
quickly.  
Considerations such as these will help develop a more consistent 
jurisprudence that will hopefully lead to a better understanding of 
when a consumer acts reasonably by incurring mitigation costs fol-
lowing a breach. With a more structured imminence analysis, courts 
can more comfortably recognize the mitigation harms (and other 
harms reasonably flowing from the breach) as merited.228 In sum, 
the Supreme Court should—as a temporary solution to Congress’ 
silence—address the circuit split resulting from Clapper and be 
clearer about standards and factors that lower courts should use in 
determining data theft standing. 
Final Thoughts on Data Misuse Situations and the Supreme 
Court’s Role 
Regarding data misuse, while courts typically try to apply 
Spokeo’s concreteness analysis (looking at the history and congres-
sional judgment related to the alleged harm), they perform it in an 
inconsistent manner that results in unpredictable outcomes.229 While 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress could confer statu-
tory rights, it also made contradicting statements that put lower 
courts in a frenzy. Is a statutory violation procedural or substantive? 
If procedural, is the violation sufficient for standing? It remains un-
clear.230 
To make matters worse, the Court introduced a two-step test, the 
historical and congressional judgment analysis, but it did not apply 
it nor provide guidance to lower courts on its application. With re-
gards to history, as mentioned above, some lower courts emphasize 
the right to privacy as a traditional harm, while other courts do not 
even mention the right to privacy at all.231 This all seems too abstract 
                                                                                                             
 228 See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th 
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and unnecessary. Instead, the analysis should focus on whether Con-
gress has spoken, and if so, whether the Court should confer stand-
ing based on a statutory violation.  
As a starting point, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife provides a clearer analysis for standing based 
on statutory violations.232 As will be explained below, it is a lower 
standard because, put simply, the Court “must be sensitive to the 
articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in 
[the] common-law tradition.”233 While Congress and the Supreme 
Court have acknowledged the right to privacy as a constitutional 
right,234 it is unclear where the protection of personal data, such as 
PII, fits within that constitutional sphere. And this is Congress’ job. 
As Justice Kennedy wrote, “Congress has the power to define inju-
ries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or 
controversy where none existed before . . . .”235 The Court should 
defer to Congress and acknowledge that privacy rights may be 
broadening through the digitization of the persona, which should 
give people certain rights over the protection and dissemination of 
their PII. This would differentiate cases where Congress has spoken 
(data misuse cases) from cases based purely on imminence of harm 
(data theft cases), in which courts say that plaintiffs rely on a “highly 
attenuated chain of possibilities.”236  
These cases also differ from data theft cases in that, typically, 
the only actor at fault is the company (instead of an unidentifiable 
hacker). By failing to comply, companies that have the sole control 
of PII put consumers in a vulnerable place. Such behavior, at least 
where Congress has spoken, should be deterred. So, for data misuse 
cases, the standard for conferring standing should not be very high. 
These suits involve new and “complicated” types of harm and more 
                                                                                                             
 232 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
 233 Id. at 580. 
 234 See generally 5 § U.S.C. 552(a) (2012) (delineating how agencies should 
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deference should be given to Congress’ consumer protection stat-
utes.237 
Specifically for data misuse cases, standing should be conferred 
so long as Congress identifies the injury it seeks to vindicate and 
relates the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.238 This 
should be the “outer limit to [Congress’ power] to confer rights of 
action” in data and consumer protection space.239 However, if Con-
gress clearly confers a harm (pursuant to Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence in Lujan), such legislation should be taken seriously to protect 
the people’s right to privacy.240 
As an example, in the case of ensuring accurate reports, the 
FCRA seems to both identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and to 
relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. 241 The 
FCRA states that “a reporting agency . . . shall follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information 
concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”242 So, it 
is indicating the injury as the inaccuracy of the report. It also states 
that any “person who willfully fails to comply with any require-
ment . . . is liable to that consumer . . . [for] any actual damages 
sustained . . . or damages [between $100 and $1000].”243 It is spe-
cifically trying to protect the persons harmed by the inaccurate re-
port. Therefore, by this standard, Congress has recognized the harm 
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and the class of persons, thereby demonstrating a “chain[] of causa-
tion” sufficient for standing.244 
Similarly, the FDCPA seeks to “protect consumers against debt 
collection abuses”245 by identifying consumers facing debt collec-
tors as the injury class and by forbidding specific practices that are 
“false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] with the collection 
of any debt.”246 Therefore, “any debt collector who fails to com-
ply . . . is liable to such person”247 because the debt collector has at 
least statutorily injured a consumer. 
As a final example, the TCPA makes it “unlawful for any person 
within the United States” to initiate “any telephone call to any resi-
dential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to de-
liver a message without . . . prior express consent . . . .”248 It creates 
a private right of action by those parties who are victims of the un-
lawful calls and establishes damages provisions to redress for the 
intrusion itself or other monetary loss.249 
The Lujan concurrence analysis fits well with the deference that 
should be due to Congress and is beneficial to courts—it leaves the 
procedural versus substantive right analysis to Congress because 
Congress can clearly express when it creates a cause of action. As 
for the public, it ensures that companies are at least abiding by the 
minimum standard set forth by federal consumer protection statutes. 
Also, assuming Congress decides to finally legislate on data theft 
cases or to create other consumer protection statutes regarding the 
integrity of PII, such statutes, coupled with this straightforward 
analysis, will help parties better understand their rights. 
CONCLUSION 
With more people online, more information being exchanged, 
and more companies getting hacked, the government needs to act to 
protect PII.250 The ideal scenario would incentivize companies to 
improve security measures and practices while not placing such a 
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burden that breach and litigation costs could bring businesses to fail 
and stall innovation. While the issue would be best tackled by Con-
gress, the Supreme Court may find itself in the driver’s seat once 
again after its Clapper and Spokeo decisions resulted in circuit splits 
and lower court confusion.251 
The imminence and concreteness requirements for standing re-
main fuddled as “early dismissals [in privacy suits] have prevented 
courts from defining what is reasonable.”252 If given the chance, the 
Court should clarify the applicable imminence standard and provide 
a set of considerations that could help lead to more predictable re-
sults and a more understandable threshold for data theft cases.253  
Further, where Congress has spoken through consumer protec-
tion statutes, the Court should apply the Lujan concurrence analysis, 
which rightfully defers to Congress the creation of privacy standing 
because of the complicated nature of privacy harms. “While merely 
complying [with statutes] may not be the best strategy for protecting 
data from increasing attacks, it does ensure that, there is a minimum 
standard to be met, at least decreasing the likelihood of a successful 
breach.”254 
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